

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MARK ALAN HOCHLEUTNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 12-C-0125

DAVID CLARK, IRVING SUESSKIND,
KRISTI KEHOSS, and PEGGY KENDRIGAN,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Mark Alan Hochleutner, who is proceeding pro se, lodged a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. Plaintiff was incarcerated at Jackson Correctional Institution in Black River Falls, Wisconsin when he filed his complaint but has since been released from custody. (ECF No. 9.)

The plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of \$350.00 for this action. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). If a prisoner does not have the money to pay the filing fee, he or she can request leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. The plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of \$1.78.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); *Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink*, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327. “Malicious,” although sometimes treated as a synonym for “frivolous,” “is more usefully construed as intended to harass.” *Lindell v. McCallum*, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109–10 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, the plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific facts and his statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its face.” *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Id.* (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). The

complaint allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).

In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should follow the principles set forth in *Twombly* by first, “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. *Id.* If there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” *Id.*

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law. *Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee*, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing *Kramer v. Village of North Fond du Lac*, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); *see also Gomez v. Toledo*, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give the plaintiff’s *pro se* allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. *See Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges David Clark, Irving Suesskind, Kristi Kehoss, and Peggy Kendrigan entered into a conspiracy with Plaintiff’s parole agent, Tracy Metz, to bring false allegations against him to get his parole suspension revoked. According to the complaint, Defendant Tracy L. Metz, Plaintiff’s Parole Agent, apparently told Plaintiff that he was not allowed to perform any contract work after his release from prison. Nevertheless, Tracy Metz alleged that on June 16, 2005, Plaintiff agreed to perform home improvement work for Defendant Flora Bergman, a citizen. Metz

alleged that Bergman initially paid Plaintiff and he started work two days later. (Compl. ¶ 10.) As this behavior violated the terms of Plaintiff's parole, Metz recommended nine months of reincarceration. (*Id.* ¶ 13.) Plaintiff contends he challenged the reincarceration and in retaliation, Metz increased her recommendation from nine months to eighteen months. (*Id.* ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges all parties involved knew the allegations leveled against him were false. (*Id.* ¶¶ 34, 37.)

Section 1983 can reach both private citizens and state employees where a plaintiff alleges that the private citizen conspired with state actors to deprive that plaintiff of a constitutional right. *See Brokaw v. Mercer County*, 235 F.3d 1000, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000); *see also Wright v. Fischer*, 215 F.3d 1331 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff has alleged such a conspiracy. While Plaintiff has not alleged many of the specifics of the conspiracy, I am satisfied that his allegations suffice for this stage of screening. Thus, Plaintiff has set forth a cognizable constitutional claim. Because Plaintiff has set forth a cognizable constitutional or federal claim, the case will proceed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* be and hereby is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, copies of plaintiff's complaint and this order are being electronically sent today to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on the state defendants.

County sheriffs, jail administrators or employees, police officers, county employees or federal agencies (such as I.C.E.) are not included and paper copies must be served on the appropriate Corporation Counsel, jail administrator or other such party by the U.S. Marshal's

Service. **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the complaint, the summons, and this order upon these defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The plaintiff is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a). The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is \$8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.114(a)(2), (a)(3). Although Congress requires the court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service precisely because *in forma pauperis* plaintiffs are indigent, it has not made any provision for these fees to be waived either by the court or by the U.S. Marshals Service.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that, pursuant to the informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court, the defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall pay the \$ 348.22 balance of the filing fee. Payments shall be forwarded to the Clerk of Court; they shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff shall submit all correspondence and legal material to:

Honorable William C. Griesbach
c/o Office of the Clerk
United States District Court - WIED
United States Courthouse
125 S. Jefferson St., Suite 102
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54301

PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT'S CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the matter.

The plaintiff is notified that from now on, he is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) to send a copy of every paper or document filed with the court to the opposing party, unless the party is represented by counsel who is registered with the Electronic Case Filing System. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). The plaintiff should also retain a personal copy of each document. If the plaintiff does not have access to a photocopy machine, he may send out identical handwritten or typed copies of any documents. The court may disregard any papers or documents which do not indicate that a copy has been sent to an unrepresented party.

The plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute.

In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.

Dated this 2nd day of May, 2012.

s/ William C. Griesbach
William C. Griesbach
United States District Judge